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Abstract 
In this paper we propose an analytical approach to obtain so-called efficient policies in terms of 
environmental and economic objectives. A policy is said to be efficient if any environmental or 
economic achievement is obtained with the minimum possible detriment to other relevant 
objectives. We apply this concept obtain the minimum possible environmental impact for a given 
growth rate or, symmetrically, the maximum economic growth for a given amount of polluting 
emissions. We present an application to Spanish economy with 2000 data using a Computable 
General Equilibrium model. We evaluate the efficiency of the observed policy and give some 
policy recommendations. Finally, we give an idea about how to enlarge the analysis by including 
additional objectives. 
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Together with traditional economic policy objectives, such as controlling 
unemployment, inflation or public deficit, nowadays public policies need to pay more 
attention to environmental protection. Moreover, both groups of objectives 
(environmental and economic) are likely to conflict with each other in the sense that 
pursuing one objective might harm the other. 
In this framework, we claim that environmental goals will be easier to defend if 
they do not imply very large losses in terms of economic objectives. And the other way 
around: economic policies will be better seen by society if they do not entail very large 
environmental impacts. In other words, policy makers should aim to design efficient 
policies  in the sense  introduced by André and Cardenete (2008, 2009a, 2009b) and 
André, Cardenete and Romero (2008, 2009) in a recent line of research addressing 
public policies as a multicriteria decision making (MCDM) problem
2. A policy (a 
combination of policy instruments) is said to be efficient if it is not possible to find another 
policy providing the same or better outcome for all the policy objectives being strictly 
better for some objective. Efficiency guarantees that the observed level of achievement 
for any objective is reached with the minimum possible cost in terms of other objectives. 
The aim of this paper is to apply the notion of efficient policy to a setting in which 
the policy makers are concerned about economic and environmental objectives and to 
provide an approach to identify such efficient policies in practice. Our approach is 
illustrated with data from Spain 2000. 
Section 2 summarizes our methodological approach, the model and the data 
used for the analysis. Section 3 presents a policy design exercise with one economic 
criterion (real growth) and one environmental criterion (CO2 emissions). Section 4 briefly 
                                                 
2 MCDM is an analytical approach to address problems with several conflicting objectives. See Ballestero 








advances how to enlarge the scope of the research by including additional economic 




2.  The model and the databases 
We describe the economic system using a Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) model following the basic principles of Walrasian equilibrium. The model includes 
a representative consumer and 26 productive sectors to match the database structure 
(see André and Cardenete 2008 for details), each sector with a single representative 
producer. Taxes and the activity of the public sector are taken as exogenous by 
consumers and firms, while they are considered as decision variables (i.e., policy 
instruments) by the government. The equilibrium of the economy is a price vector and a 
vector of activity levels such that the consumer is maximising her utility, producers are 
maximising their profits and supply equals demand in all markets. To save some space, 
we just present some of the main elements of the model. Some additional details can be 
found in André et al. (2005). See Kehoe and others (2005) for an overview of CGE 
models. 
The production technology is given by a nested production function. The domestic 
output of sector  j  ( 1,...,26 j = ) is obtained by combining, through a Leontief technology, 
outputs all sectors and value added. In turn, value added is generated from primary 
inputs (labor and capital), combined by a Cobb-Douglas technology. Overall output of 
sector  j  is obtained from a Cobb-Douglas combination of domestic output and imports 








The government raises taxes to obtain public revenue, R , as well as it gives 
transfers to the private sector, TPS , and demands goods and services from each sector, 





PB R TPS cpi GD p
=
=− − ∑       (1) 
cpi  being the Consumer Price Index and  j p  the price, before Value Added Tax (VAT), 
of good  j . 
There are 26 different goods. Final demand comes from investment, exports and 
consumption demand. A representative consumer pays taxes, demands consumption 
goods and saves the remainder of her disposable income in order to maximize a Cobb-
Douglas utility function. 
Concerning pollution, we focus on CO2 emissions and we adopt a short-term 
approach. The production technology is assumed to be fixed and so is the pollution 
intensity of all the sectors, according to the following linear relationship: 
. j jj EQ =α       ( 2 )  
where  j E  and  j Q  denote respectively emissions and output of sector  j  and  j α  is a 
sector-specific technical parameter measuring emissions per unit of output. There is an 
environmental tax of t euros per unit of emissions, due to which sector  j  pays  j T : 
j j Tt E =⋅
      (3) 
The same tax on pollution implies a different economic burden in terms of output. 
Substituting (2) into (3), we get 
        
jj j TQ =β ⋅
          ( 4 )  








The model is calibrated using the aggregated 2000 social accounting matrix for 
Spain (see Cardenete and Fuentes, 2007) and data on emissions from the Spanish 
national statistical institute (INE). 
We approach policy design by assuming that the government solves a MCDM 
problem, including all the equations of the CGE model as constraints. The optimal value 
of the policy instruments are chosen in order to achieve efficient results in terms of the 
policy objectives. 
We consider as policy instruments taxes and public expenditure. Concerning 
taxes, we take the average rate of direct taxes -income tax and the social security 
contribution of employees- and indirect taxes -value added tax (VAT) and payroll tax, 
allowing for a different tax rate in each activity sector-, as well as the emissions charge. 
For the sake of realism, all the instruments (except the emissions charge) are restricted 
to vary no more than 5% with respect to the observed value. Moreover, although public 
expenditure can vary 5% by sector, total expenditure must remain equal to the observed 
value. Concerning the emissions charge, we set a lower bound of 0 (pollution cannot be 
subsidized) and an upper bound equal to 0.02 euros per kton/year of CO2 emissions, to 
avoid an unrealistically high tax burden
3. 
 
3. Determining efficient policies in terms of growth and emissions 
Assume that the government is concerned about two policy objectives: the first 
one is to increase economic growth as measured by the one-year growth rate of total 
output, denoted by  Q g . The second objective is to reduce CO2 emissions. We take as an 
indicator the growth rate of emissions with respect to the observed value in 2000, 
denoted as  E g . 
                                                 
3 Specifically, when the environmental tax rate is set at its highest rate, the most polluting sector (which is  









So-called payoff matrix (see Table 1) is obtained by optimizing each objective 
separately. The first row shows that the maximum attainable growth is 4.94%, which 
would imply a 0.59% increase in emissions. 
Table 1. Growth-CO2 emissions payoff matrix 
   Q g  (%)  E g  (%) 
Q Max g   4.94 0.59 
E Min g   3.45  -2.01 
 
The second row shows that it would be possible to reduce emissions about 2% 
but the economic consequence of this policy would be an economic growth rate of 3.45 
%, about 1.5 below its maximum. 
Regarding the optimal values of policy instruments, maximizing growth is 
consistent with no emissions charge, while minimizing emissions entails the highest 
value for this tax. Maximizing growth also requires reducing all indirect taxes whereas 
minimizing emissions requires increasing them. Both solutions entail increasing direct 
taxes. Maximizing growth requires shifting public expenditures to sector 17 (“vehicles”) 
and minimizing emissions is consistent with increasing public expenditure in Sector 25 
(“other services”), which is one of the less polluting. 
We approximate the set of efficient policies using so-called constraint method 
(Marglin 1967): we made a partition in the feasible range of  E g , (2.01% to 0.59%) and, 
denoting by  _ En g  the n-th value in this partition, we maximize growth imposing that 

















Figure 1 shows the results of these calculations. Tougher environmental targets 
always imply lower growth rates but the slope of the efficient frontier is higher for low 
values of emissions than for higher values. Therefore, as the government pursues 
tougher environmental objectives, the marginal cost in terms of foregone growth is 
increasing. The observed combination in Spain 2000 ( 0 E g = ,  4.4 Q g = . Source: INE) is 
below the frontier. We conclude that the policy followed by the government could be 
improved in terms of efficiency. Indeed, alternative policies could provide about 0.4 
additional points of growth with the same emissions or, alternatively, the same growth 
rate while reducing emissions about 1%. 
 
Figure 1 
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4. Efficient policies with more than two criteria 
 
Assume that, apart from growth and emissions, the government is also concerned 
about reducing unemployment, u , public deficit, PD and fiscal pressure,  FP (total tax 
collections as a percentage of GDP). 
Table 2 represents the new payoff matrix. Maximizing growth and minimizing 
unemployment provide essentially the same solution. Therefore, the same conflict 
between emissions and growth also exists between emissions and unemployment. 
Indeed, emission minimization displays a strong conflict with all economic objectives 
since all of them achieve their worst values. 
 
Table 2. Payoff matrix with 5 objectives 
  (%) Q g    (%) E g    (%) u   6 (10 €) PD   (%) FP  
Q Max g   4,94  0,59 13,10 17.59  33,06 
E Min g   3.45  -2,01  15,28 24.55 34,84 
Min u  4,94 0,56  13,09  17.68 33,05 
Min PD   4,05 -0,79  14,41  13.82  34,84 
Min FP  4,44 0,16  13,83  16.02  32,96 
Note: bold (underlined) figures represent ideal (anti-ideal) values. 
 
But the conflict between emissions and public deficit is not as straightforward as 
one may think. While minimizing deficit is compatible with a noticeable reduction of 
emissions (-0.79 %), reducing emissions from this point to their minimum would bring a 
strong increase of deficit, 70% above its minimum. These results suggest the existence 
of a non-monotonic relationship between both variables. A similar conclusion can be 








economic objectives: minimizing public deficit involves almost 1 point below the ideal 
value of growth, more than one additional point of unemployment with respect to the 
minimum and a high value of fiscal pressure. 
The enlarged problem can be tackled by different computational techniques (see 
Evans, 1984), a systematic exploration of which is beyond the scope of this paper. As an 
illustration, we present the so-called weighting method (Zadeh, 1963), which works by 
maximizing the following weighted average of the normalized objectives: 
 
** * **
** * * *
** * * *
QQ E Q uu PDP D F PF P
QEu P D F P
Q Q E E u u PD PD FP FP
gg g g gg gg gg
gg g g gg g g g g
−− − −−
ω+ ω+ ω + ω + ω
−− − − −
   (6) 
 
where 
* X  represents the ideal value and  * X  the anti-ideal value of objective  X . Each 
quotient is normalized and bounded between zero and one. The ω coefficients are 
preference parameters measuring the importance of objectives. Alternative combinations 
of  ω provide different efficient policies corresponding to different preferences. As an 
example, assume that the policy maker considers that all the objectives are equally 
important: 
QE u P D F P  === = ωω ω ωω  
Then, maximizing (7) provides the following solution: 
 
4.42% Q g=     0.9% E g=   −   13.83% u =   
6 14552 10 € PD =⋅        32.69% FP =    
 
The observed values in Spain 2000 are the following: 
 
        4.4% Q g =   0% E g =   14.0% u =     









The solution given by the weighting method Pareto-dominates the observed one 
since it provides the same or better values for all the objectives. Therefore, the observed 
policy could be improved in terms of efficiency if we restrict to the selected criteria and 
given the feasible set of policy instruments. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The concept of efficient policies allows us to represent the aim to get a certain 
result for each objective with the lowest possible detriment for other objectives. We apply 
this concept to a setting in which the government is assumed to be concerned about 
economic and environmental objectives. 
Our approach provides an approximation to the set of efficient policies as well as 
an estimation of the sacrifice that environmental goals entail in terms of foregone growth. 
It is also possible to determine in which directions the policy mixed should be 
reformulated to get efficient combinations of economic activity and environmental impact. 
The model can be enlarged to include more than two objectives to get a higher degree of 
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